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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, RW

SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY CEASEFIRE TALKS WITH THE RPF

REF:            (A) 92 KIGALI 2756, (B) 92 STATE 216116.

              (C) 92 KAMPALA 3729

BRUSSELS/DUBROW; LONDON/MCKINLEY/ PARIS/PERLOW; GENEVA/RMA

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

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2. SENIOR MILITARY ADVISER COLONEL CHARLES SNYDER AND

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AF/C DESK OFFICER CAROL FULLER MET FOR 3 HOURS ON JULY 7 WITH THE RPF DELEGATION LED BY MILITARY COMMANDER PAUL KAGAME. USING A DRAFT RPF POSITION PAPER AS THE FOCUS FOR THE DISCUSSIONS. SNYDER COMMENTED ON BOTH SUBSTANCE AND TEXT, SHARING APPROACHES THAT HAVE WORKED IN OTHER NEGOTIATIONS AND HIGHLIGHTING POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS. BASED ON THESE TALKS AND REPORTS OF ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISER JOHN BYERLY'S MEETINGS WITH GOR OFFICIALS IN KIGALI, SEVERAL AREAS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOR AND THE

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RPF APPEAR TO BE EMERGING, INCLUDING THE NEED FOR A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, REVISION OF THE OAU MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP, FORMATION OF A DMZ, AND CREATION OF A MIXED MONITORING COMMISSION WITH GOR/RPF PARTICIPATION. SIMILARLY, MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS HAVE SURFACED--DEFINITION OF DMZ BOUNDARIES, INTEGRATION OF THE TWO ARMIES, SUPPLY

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LOGISTICS, AND FORMATION OF A NATIONAL COUNCIL (NOT NATIONAL CONFERENCE) TO PRESIDE OVER THE INTERIM PERIOD.

3. DURING A SUBSEQUENT 2-HOUR MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN EMBASSIES, KAGAME STATED THE RPF'S MINIMUM GOALS AT ARUSHA AS AGREEMENT ON A CEASEFIRE AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO ESTABLISH CHECKS AND BALANCES DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD. IN A FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE TESTY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RPF AND THE GOF, KAGAME AND FRENCH EMBASSY COUNSELOR NICOLAS NORMAND MAY HAVE DEFUSED TENSIONS AND REESTABLISHED AT LEAST A PRO-FORMA ROLE FOR THE GOF AS THE LEAD PLAYER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. KAGAME HAS PROVED HIMSELF AN INTELLIGENT AND RATIONAL NEGOTIATOR IN A MANNER THAT BELIES A LACK OF PREVIOUS DIPLOMATIC EXPERIENCE. FROM THE WASHINGTON PERSPECTIVE, WE ARE OPTIMISTIC THAT THE ARUSHA TALKS COULD REPRESENT A GOOD BEGINNING TO WHAT WILL INEVITABLY BE A LONG NEGOTIATING PROCESS, IF NO MAJOR MILITARY OFFENSIVES OCCUR IN THE MEANTIME. END SUMMARY.

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MORNING SESSION  
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4. SENIOR MILITARY ADVISER COLONEL CHARLES SNYDER AND AF/C DESK OFFICER CAROL FULLER MET FOR THREE HOURS JULY 7 WITH THE RPF DELEGATION LED BY MILITARY COMMANDER MAJOR PAUL KAGAME. MILITARY ADVISER ROBERT HESS, DOD ANALYSTS LTC TONY MARLEY AND CAPTAIN STEVEN HOWELL, AND UGANDAN DESK OFFICER LUCIEN VANDENBROUCKE SAT IN ON PART OF THE

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BELGIAN DCM JAN GRAULS. AF/C DIRECTOR ROBERT PRINGLE, AND INCOMING UGANDAN DESK OFFICER CHRIS WILSON SAT IN ON THE AFTERNOON SESSION. THE RPF DELEGATION INCLUDED DR. THEOGEN RUDASINGA (DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS FOR AFRICA), DR. EMMANUEL NDAHIRO (OSTENSIBLY FROM RWANDA), CLAUDE DUSAIDI (DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS FOR NORTH AMERICA), AND DR. CHARLES MURIGANDE (WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE).

5. OPENING THE MORNING SESSION WITH A REPORT OF ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISER JOHN BYERLY'S MEETINGS WITH GOR OFFICIALS IN

KIGALI AND A DISCUSSION OF MECHANICS FOR CEASEFIRE TALKS, SNYDER STATED HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE JULY 10-12 TALKS IN ARUSHA COULD PRODUCE AT A MINIMUM A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, BUT THAT THE NEGOTIATORS SHOULD TRY TO GO FURTHER AND AGREE ON A CEASEFIRE OR AT LEAST A TARGET DATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A CEASEFIRE. HE FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT AFTER THE ARUSHA TALKS THE DELEGATIONS CONSULT WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE SIDES AND RETURN FOR AN INTENSE TWO WEEKS OF FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS. (COMMENT: REPORTING INDICATES THE GOR AGREES WITH THIS SCENARIO. END COMMENT.)

6. KAGAME RESPONDED BY TABLING A THREE-PAGE POSITION DOCUMENT INCLUDING PROPOSALS FOR A CEASEFIRE, TRANSITIONAL POWER SHARING ARRANGEMENTS, AND INTEGRATION OF THE TWO ARMIES AND FORMATION OF A NATIONAL ARMY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS A DRAFT DOCUMENT PREPARED INTENTIONALLY FOR THE WASHINGTON TALKS AND THAT THE FINAL DOCUMENT PRESENTED IN ARUSHA WILL INCLUDE FURTHER DETAILS BUT NO MAJOR NEW PROPOSALS. NOTING THAT PREVIOUS CEASEFIRE ATTEMPTS HAVE

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FAILED BECAUSE THE GOR HAD ONLY AGREED IN ORDER TO BUY TIME, HE INSISTED THAT GOR COMMITMENTS WILL BE REQUIRED THIS TIME ON A SET OF PRINCIPLES BEFORE A CEASEFIRE CAN BE IMPLEMENTED. SNYDER AND KAGAME AGREED THAT THE N. SELE ACCORD CAN FORM THE BASIC DOCUMENT FOR A NEW AGREEMENT BUT THAT IT CAN BE IMPROVED; ITS MAJOR FLAW IS THE LACK OF AN EFFECTIVE MONITORING BODY. (COMMENT: REPORTING INDICATES THE GOR IS ALSO PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE A SET OF POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AT THE TALKS. END COMMENT.) OBSERVING THAT THE RPF POSITION PAPER INCLUDES SOUND PROPOSALS, SNYDER

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THEN PROCEEDED TO EXAMINE WITH KAGAME IN DEPTH THE IDEAS AND THE WORDING OF THE DOCUMENT, SHARING DIFFERENT APPROACHES THAT HAVE BEEN USED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON ANGOLA, NAMIBIA, AND MOZAMBIQUE. HE FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT THE FINAL PAPER MIGHT BE TITLED POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND INCORPORATE THE CEASEFIRE AND INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES AS SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS.

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CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL  
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7. THE RPF PROPOSAL ON A CEASEFIRE INCLUDES SIX ELEMENTS. THE FIRST TWO SPECIFY THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT PROVIDE FOR A NEUTRAL ZONE AND A NEUTRAL MONITORING FORCE RATHER THAN A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE (WHICH WOULD IMPOSE A PEACE RATHER THAN MONITOR MOVEMENTS) AS THE GOR HAS SUGGESTED IN THE PAST. SNYDER STRESSED THAT DELINEATION OF THE ZONE SHOULD BE BASED ON SOME PHYSICAL, RATHER THAN

POLITICAL, FACT, SUCH AS THE RANGE OF WEAPONS--E.G., BOTH  
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SIDES USE KATUSHYA ROCKETS WHICH HAVE AN APPROXIMATE 10 KM RANGE. HE ALSO ADVISED THAT CLEAR GROUND RULES FOR THE MONITORING FORCE MUST BE ESTABLISHED. DETERMINING HOW THE ZONE WILL OPERATE IS CRITICAL: POSSIBILITIES ARE A RADIO COMMAND NET WITH A CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS POST OR, LESS EFFECTIVELY, MONITORS STATIONED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. SNYDER THEN SUGGESTED A VARIETY OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES SUCH AS EXCHANGE OF DATA ON WEAPONS AND RANGES AND A JOINT MINE REMOVAL PROGRAM. KAGAME NOTED THAT MINES LAID BY BOTH SIDES REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM.  
(COMMENT: DURING THE TALKS, KAGAME APPEARED COMFORTABLE WITH AN APPARENT BALANCE IN FIRE POWER ON THE TWO SIDES. ON JULY 8, AS DESCRIBED REF B, HE EXHIBITED A GREAT DEAL OF CONCERN ABOUT REPORTS FROM HIS INTELLIGENCE SOURCES THAT THE FAR HAD JUST ACQUIRED SUPERIOR FIRE POWER IN THE FORM OF SOUTH AFRICAN 155 MM GUNS. END COMMENT.)

8. ELEMENTS THREE AND FOUR SPECIFY A DEFINITIVE TIME FRAME WITHIN WHICH THE CEASEFIRE MUST BE IMPLEMENTED AND A SEQUENCE OF EVENTS TO FORCE THE TWO PARTIES TO FOCUS ON PROBLEM SOLVING WITHIN A TIME SCHEDULE.

9. ON THE FIFTH POINT CONCERNING RESOURCES NECESSARY FOR THE MONITORING FORCE, SNYDER WARNED THE RPF THAT WESTERN RESOURCES (ESPECIALLY THOSE OF THE USG) ARE LIMITED AND

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THAT THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO GET MUCH BEYOND THOSE OF THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN ALREADY IN COUNTRY. HE ADVISED THEM TO BE REALISTIC IN PLANNING AND NOT TO FEAR USING THE FRENCH AFTER A POLITICAL AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED.

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10. SNYDER APPLAUDED THE FINAL POINT CALLING FOR JOINT  
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PARTICIPATION OF THE GOR AND THE RPF (A MIXED COMMISSION)  
IN THE MONITORING FORCE AS AN EXCELLENT CONFIDENCE  
BUILDING MEASURE.

11. COMMENT: REPORTING INDICATES THE RPF AND GOR MAY  
AGREE ON A NEUTRAL ZONE WITHIN RWANDA AND A MIXED  
COMMISSION, BUT THAT DETERMINATION OF THE BOUNDARIES FOR  
THE NEUTRAL ZONE WILL BE A DIFFICULT PROCESS. END COMMENT.

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INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES AND FORMATION OF A NATIONAL ARMY  
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12. SKIPPING TO THE THIRD SECTION OF THE POSITION PAPER  
ON INTEGRATION OF THE TWO ARMIES AND FORMATION OF A  
NATIONAL ARMY, SNYDER ADVISED THE RPF TO MODIFY ITS STATED

RATIONALE WHICH ACCUSES THE ARMY OF FACTIONALISM AND  
CRIMES AGAINST THE PEOPLE AND INSTEAD EMPLOY A POSITIVE  
PREAMBLE: E.G., THE PARTIES AGREE TO FORM A POLITICALLY  
NEUTRAL NATIONAL ARMY MADE UP OF ALL RWANDANS FOR THE  
PURPOSE OF GUARANTEEING POLITICAL AND SECURITY RIGHTS AND  
TO SAFEGUARD THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. HE THEN PROVIDED  
ADVICE ON THE SIX ELEMENTS CONCERNING THE NATURE OF SUCH  
AN ARMY.

13. ON THE FIRST TWO ELEMENTS--SIZE AND PERCENTAGE OF  
PARTICIPATION OF EACH SIDE--SNYDER ALSO ADVISED THE RPF TO  
CONSIDER HOW MANY AND WHICH OF ITS OWN SOLDIERS IT WISHES  
TO PLACE IN THE ARMY AND HOW MANY TO LEAVE OUT IN ORDER TO  
SUPPORT THE RPF AS POLITICAL CADRES IN FORTHCOMING

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ELECTIONS--A FACTOR THAT COUNTED HEAVILY IN THE ANGOLAN  
TALKS. KAGAME RESPONDED THAT THE RPF'S MAIN CONCERN IS  
THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTICIPATION, NOT THE PERCENTAGE FOR  
EACH SIDE.

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14. BASED ON EXPERIENCE IN OTHER NEGOTIATIONS, SNYDER NOTED THAT CRITERIA TO DETERMINE ELIGIBILITY FOR THE ARMY--THE THIRD ELEMENT--CAN USUALLY BE FOUND IN EXISTING LAWS, CONSTITUTIONS, ARMY AND POLICE DOCUMENTS, ETC.

15. WITH RESPECT TO TRAINING AND EQUIPING THE NATIONAL ARMY, SNYDER ONCE AGAIN CAUTIONED REALISM OF EXPECTATIONS--ONCE THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IS REACHED, THE FRENCH OR BELGIANS COULD BE ASKED TO PROVIDE SECURITY ASSISTANCE WITH PERHAPS THE ADDITION OF A MORE NEUTRAL THIRD PARTY SUCH AS THE GERMANS.

16. ON DEMOBILIZATION, BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE THINKING NOW ABOUT WHAT THEY WANT IN TERMS OF EQUALITY OF PAY. TRAINING AND TREATMENT. DEFERRAL OF THIS ISSUE WAS A MISTAKE IN ANGOLA AND THE TWO SIDES SHOULD FOCUS ON THE COMMON GOAL OF SEEKING INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING FROM THE WORLD BANK.

17. FINALLY, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE REFORM OF THE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS--THE SIXTH POINT--THE PARTIES COULD AGREE TO A PRINCIPLE TO REVIEW PUBLIC SAFETY INSTITUTIONS, BUT THESE INSTITUTIONS SHOULD BE SPECIFIED BY NAME IN THE DOCUMENT FROM THE BEGINNING--ARMY GENDARMERIE. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, ETC.

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18. COMMENT: REPORTING INDICATES THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON INTEGRATING OR "FUSING" THE TWO ARMIES WILL BE DIFFICULT, BUT THAT THE GOR ACCEPTS THE NEED TO NEGOTIATE SOME FORM

OF INTEGRATION. END COMMENT.

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TRANSITIONAL POWER SHARING ARRANGEMENTS  
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19. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HIS EXPERTISE LIES MORE IN THE MILITARY ASPECTS, SNYDER TOUCHED ONLY BRIEFLY ON THE ELEMENTS IN THE PROPOSALS FOR TRANSITIONAL POWER SHARING ARRANGEMENTS, SUGGESTING THAT VALUE LADEN WORDS BE AVOIDED. FULLER WARNED THAT THE TERM "POWER SHARING" ITSELF IS A BUZZ WORD WHICH CONNOTES FOR MANY RWANDANS AN RPF DESIRE TO DOMINATE THE POLITICAL PROCESS. KAGAME REFUTED THIS CONNOTATION AND EXPLAINED A NATIONAL COUNCIL WHICH IS BROADBASED AND WHICH HAS FULL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS WILL PRESIDE OVER THE INTERIM PERIOD

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20. THE RPF'S PROPOSED INTERIM PROGRAM CONSISTS OF EIGHT ELEMENTS:

-- COMPLETION OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE TWO ARMIES AND THE FORMATION OF A NATIONAL ARMY;

-- RETURN' RESETTLEMENT, AND INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES AND OTHER DISPLACED PERSONS;

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-- RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION OF WAR RAVAGED AREAS;

-- ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL REFORMS NECESSARY TO ENSURE A GENUINE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS AND FOSTER NATIONAL UNITY;

-- CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO GUARANTEE THAT POWER NOT REST WITH A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL;

-- ORGANIZATION OF A NATIONAL DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY;

-- PREPARATION AND CARRYING OUT OF ELECTIONS;

-- ANY OTHER PROGRAM AGREED UPON BY THE GOVERNING NATIONAL COUNCIL.

21. EXPRESSING DEEP SCEPTICISM OF THE GOR.S COMMITMENT TO THE RIGHT OF REFUGEES TO RETURN TO RWANDA, THE RPF EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR DETAILED FLANNING FOR REPATRIATION. SNYDER SUGGESTED THAT THE REFUGEE PRINCIPLE

IN THE FINAL ARUSHA DOCUMENT COULD STATE THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IS REFUGEE RIGHT OF RETURN. ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES COULD BE BUILT INTO THE DOCUMENT SUCH AS AGREEMENT TO ASK UNHCR FOR TECHNICAL ADVICE OR TO REQUEST A REPORT FROM UNHCR BY A CERTAIN DATE ON PLANS FOR A DURABLE SOLUTION.

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AFTERNOON SESSION

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22. RECONVENING IN THE AFTERNOON FOR A TWO-HOUR SESSION, THE GROUP WAS JOINED BY AF/C DIRECTOR ROBERT PRINGLE, INCOMING DESK OFFICER CHRIS WILSON, FRENCH EMBASSY COUNSELOR NICOLAS NORMAND, AND BELGIAN DCM JAN GRAULS. KAGAME CLARIFIED THAT THE DRAFT PAPER REPRESENTS THE GENERAL VIEWS WHICH THE RPF WILL PRESENT AT ARUSHA. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION ON HOW THE NATIONAL COUNCIL WILL FUNCTION, HE EXPLAINED THAT THE PAPER PROPOSES A PRINCIPLE AND THAT THE FRAMEWORK WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT IN DETAIL AFTERWARDS. NEITHER THE NATIONAL COUNCIL NOR THE NATIONAL DEBATE CONSTITUTE A DEMAND FOR A NATIONAL CONFERENCE.

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RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH  
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23. NORMAND CONCLUDED HIS QUESTIONING BY RESTATING THAT THE GOF HAS THE LEAD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN RWANDA WITH ASSISTANCE FROM WESTERN COLLEAGUES AND BY ISSUING AN OPEN INVITATION TO KAGAME TO VISIT PARIS. PRINGLE THEN REMINDED KAGAME OF THE USG'S REQUEST THAT A PERMANENT RPF REPRESENTATIVE BE ESTABLISHED IN KAMPALA TO FACILITATE FUTURE CONTACT AND SUGGESTED THAT A SIMILAR ARRANGEMENT BE WORKED OUT FOR THE FRENCH.

24. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPENING, KAGAME EXPLAINED THAT THE PROBLEM WITH THE FRENCH HAS NOT BEEN ONE OF CONTACT, BUT OF THE RELATIONSHIP. FROM THE RPF

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PERSPECTIVE, WHAT IT PERCEIVES AS DIRECT FRENCH INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT ERODES THE APPEARANCE OF GOF NEUTRALITY. AS EXAMPLES, HE CITED THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CONSISTENT EXPLANATION OF THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF FRENCH TROOPS ON THE GROUND. RPF SOURCES INDICATE THE FRENCH TROOPS SUPPORT THE FAR EVEN ON THE BATTLEFIELD. FRENCH FAILURE TO NOTIFY THE RPF OF THEIR INTENTION TO EVACUATE FOREIGNERS FROM BYUMBA RECENTLY WAS INTERPRETED

BY THE RPF AS A HOSTILE ACT. (COMMENT: KAGAME STRESSED AND NORMAND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE FRENCH HAD NOTIFIED THE RPF OF THEIR INTENTIONS PRIOR TO EVACUATING FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM RUHENGERI IN JANUARY 1991. END COMMENT.) MOREOVER, THE RPF WAS PARTICULARLY BOTHERED BY DIJOUD'S CLEAR STATEMENT TO KAGAME IN SEPTEMBER 1991 THAT FRENCH

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TROOPS WERE IN RWANDA TO PROTECT THE REGIME. THE RPF IS CONVINCED THAT THE FRENCH PRESENCE AND SUCH STATEMENTS GIVE THE GOR A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY WHICH MAKES THE NEGOTIATIONS MORE DIFFICULT.

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25. NORMAND THANKED KAGAME FOR HIS FRANKNESS IN DESCRIBING THE PROBLEM IN THE RPF/GOF RELATIONSHIP. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE FRENCH TROOPS ARE IN RWANDA SOLELY TO PROTECT FOREIGN NATIONALS UNDER CONDITIONS OF CIVIL WAR. HAVING SAID THAT, HE CONTINUED THAT FRANCE REALIZES FULL WELL THAT ITS TROOPS OFFER A DEGREE OF "COMFORT" TO THE GOR. THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY A BAD THING BECAUSE THE CONFLICT MUST BE RESOLVED BY A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND NOT BY FORCE OF ARMS; A MILITARY SOLUTION WOULD RISK TOTAL DISORDER. NORMAND FURTHER STATED THAT THE GOF HAS BEEN USING ITS INFLUENCE ON HABYARIMANA TO FIND A POLITICAL

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SOLUTION. FRANCE IS STILL INTERESTED IN ANCHORING TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

26. PRINGLE THEN REITERATED THE USG INTEREST IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND OUR BELIEF THAT THERE IS A REAL DESIRE FOR PEACE IN RWANDA ITSELF NOW. FRANCE HAS HISTORICALLY PLAYED THE LEAD ROLE AND THE USG CAN NOT PLAY A MAJOR ROLE THERE EVEN IF WE WANTED TO. HE CONCLUDED WITH THE OBSERVATION THAT WE SEE NO PROSPECT FOR RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT THAT IS NOT MULTILATERAL, INCLUDING PARTICIPATION BY THE EX-COLONIAL BELGIAN POWER.

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COMMENT  
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27. KAGAME SPEAKS VERY SLOWLY AND DELIBERATELY BUT CONVEYS AN INTELLIGENT, RATIONAL APPROACH. WHATEVER HIS REAL INTENTIONS, HE GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF BEING SINCERE ABOUT WANTING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHILE DEEPLY DISTRUSTING THE GOR. ALTHOUGH THE TALKS THIS WEEK IN WASHINGTON AND REPORTS WE HAVE GIVEN HIM OF TALKS IN KIGALI HAVE APPARENTLY MADE KAGAME MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE ARUSHA TALKS, HE IS ADAMANT THAT HE WILL NOT AGREE THIS TIME TO A CEASEFIRE WITHOUT GOR COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE POLITICAL AND SECURITY GUARANTEES. HE MADE PERSONAL

REFERENCES ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TO COMMANDERS IN HIS ARMY WHO HAD BEEN KILLED BECAUSE HE KAGAME HAD TRUSTED THE WORD OF THE GOR TO MAINTAIN A CEASEFIRE.

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28. WITH RESPECT TO RPF/GOF RELATIONS, WE BELIEVE KAGAME'S FRANK INTERCHANGE WITH FRENCH COUNSELOR NORMAND MAY HAVE DEFUSED SOME OF THE TENSION BETWEEN THE RPF AND THE GOF. DURING THE MORNING SESSION, KAGAME HAD STRENUOUSLY OPPOSED ANY FURTHER MEDIATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE FRENCH DUE TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT "ON THE GROUND." DURING THE LUNCH BREAK, FULLER POINTED OUT CANDIDLY TO KAGAME THAT IF THE FRENCH WITHDREW OR WERE FORCED TOTALLY OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE USG WOULD BE UNABLE TO CONTINUE THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IT HAS BEGUN TO PROVIDE. KAGAME TOOK THE POINT, NOTING WRYLY THAT DIPLOMACY IS COMPLEX. DURING THE FOLLOWING SESSION AND AN OPEN MEETING WITH THE U.S. COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES JULY 8 HE VERY CAREFULLY AVOIDED STRESSING CONTINUED RPF OPPOSITION TO THE FRENCH. INSTEAD, HE NOTED PUBLICLY IN THE LATTER MEETING THAT THE RPF HAD "INITIALLY" STRONGLY REFUSED FRENCH MEDIATION AND INSISTED THAT THE GOF PARTICIPATE IN THE ARUSHA TALKS AS AN OBSERVER; HE NEVER STATED WHAT RPF INTENTIONS ARE NOW WITH RESPECT TO THE FRENCH.

29. KAGAME CLEARLY BELIEVES HE HAS MADE HIMSELF VULNERABLE BY FROMISING NOT TO LAUNCH A MAJOR ATTACK AGAINST THE FAR UNLESS THE FAR TAKES THE FIRST STEP. AS OF LATE JULY 8, HE WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE THREAT TO HIS TROOPS OF THE REPORTEDLY SUPERIOR FIRE POWER OF THE FAR. MOREOVER, HIS INTELLIGENCE SOURCES CONTINUE TO REPORT TO HIM THAT THE FAR MAY BE PLANNING A MAJOR ATTACK. WITH REPORTS FROM KIGALI OF SIMILAR GOR PARANOIA ABOUT RPF PLANS TO LAUNCH A MAJOR OFFENSIVE ON BYUMBA, IT MAY BE THAT SUSPICIONS ON BOTH SIDES COULD LEAD TO SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECIES. AT THIS POINT. WE HAVE DONE

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EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO FACILITATE THE TALKS IN ARUSHA. IF BOTH SIDES CAN REFRAIN FROM ESCALATING THE CONFRONTATIONS IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS, THERE IS HOPE THAT THE ARUSHA TALKS COULD REPRESENT A GOOD BEGINNING TO WHAT WILL INEVITABLY BE A LONG NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

30. FOR KAMPALA: AS REQUESTED REF C, AMBASSADOR CARSON IS AUTHORIZED TO BRIEF MUSEVENI IN GENERAL ON THE TALKS WITH KAGAME IN WASHINGTON.

EAGLEBURGER

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